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Abstract: Slavoj  i ek and Julia Kristeva have followed strikingly similar
paths in their intellectual and political development, moving from Marxism through
psychoanalysis to Christianity. This article traces the way they have distanced them-
selves from Marxism and taken up psychoanalysis, of either the Freudian or Lacani-
an variety. For Kristeva, psychoanalysis provides the therapeutic solution to indivi-
dualandattimessocialproblems,whereasfor i ekitisthebestdescriptionofthose
problems without necessarily providing answers. However, through psychoanalysis,
they have gone a step further and become enamoured with Christianity, especially
Paul’slettersintheNewTestamentandthedoctrineoflove.PaulprovidesforKriste-
va another and earlier version of psychoanalytic solutions, but he enables  i ek to
findthesocialandpoliticalanswersforwhichheseeks.Byconnectingtheseintellec-
tualmoveswiththeirowndeparturesfromEasternEurope,onefromYugoslavia(and
then Slovenia) and the other from Bulgaria, I argue that their search for redemption,
of both personal and social forms, betrays a residual socialism. In fact, their moves
into psychoanalysis and Christianity may be read as compensations for a lost socia-
lism, so much so that  i ek at least makes a belated recovery of Marx through Chris-
tianity and Kristeva can never quite excise Marx from her thought.
Keywords:Slavoj i ek,JuliaKristeva,Marxism,psychoanalysis,Christianity.
For all their studied avoidance of one another, Slavoj  i ek
and Julia Kristeva have followed strikingly similar paths. They have
both moved out of Marxism to psychoanalysis and then to religion.
Both find that Christianity, especially the idea of Christian love, pro-
vides the mechanism for social, political and, for Kristeva, personal
transformation. And both have moved physically from Eastern Eu-
rope, one from Bulgaria and the other from Yugoslavia (and then
Slovenia), to what may be called superstar status in the West. There
are, of course differences as well – they interpret psychoanalysis in
their own ways, Kristeva also sees psychoanalysis as salvific,  i ek
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7has rediscovered Marx through Christianity, and so on – and I will
alsoexplorethesedifferences.However,thesimilaritiesaremorethan
striking, so much so that such similarities are far more than merely
analogousoraccidental.WhatIproposetodointhisessay,then,isex-
plore their parallel paths – at intellectual, personal and political levels
– and suggest some possible reasons for their paired moves.
Let me outline my argument before proceeding. I begin by
tracing the way  i ek and Kristeva distance themselves from Marx-
ism by means of psychoanalysis. Freud and Lacan, suitably reinter-
preted,providethemwiththemeansfortrumpingMarx.Psychoanal-
ysis is, if you like, an alternative materialismfor Marxism. Secondly,
Iaminterestedinthewaytheyembracereligionthroughpsychoanal-
ysis. At this level, they come very close to one another, for they feel
that Christianity, especially the texts of the New Testament by Paul,
may bring about revolutionary and therapeutic change. In both cases
such a move to Christianity functions as a substitute for a sidelined
Marxism,whichtheycannotexcisecompletely.Forwhattheyseekis
not a spiritual Christianity that provides spiritual solutions, but a ma-
terialist Christianity that provides distinct social, political and psy-
chological remedies. Thirdly, I compare their remarkably similar
focus on ‘Christian love’, especially through Paul’s letters. For Kris-
teva Paul provides a mode of social transformation both through the
doctrineofloveandthroughthetherapeuticinstitutionoftheekklesia
or church in which all the pathologies may be overcome. For  i ek
the doctrine of love is the revolutionary core of Christianity, one that
shouldneverbeforgotten.Finally,Isuggestthattheirintellectualtra-
jectories function at two levels. On the one hand, they are allegories
for, or indeed are the ideological complements for their personal
moves out of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, their intellectual
paths may also be seen as nostalgia for the lost opportunities of so-
cialism in Eastern Europe. With the redemptive possibilities of so-
cialism exhausted, they seek an alternative political and social re-
demption that may overcome the rampages of capitalism.
What Marx Did, Psychoanalysis Can Do Better
On their first step of their search for alternative models of so-
cial redemption, both  i ek and Kristeva enthusiastically and com-
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of our age – in favour of Marx. However, in order to justify such a
move, in their earlier work they seek to show how psychoanalysis
provides the answers that Marx left hanging. Marx may have pro-
videdtheinitial insight, butFreudandLacanarebyfarhissuperiors.
Now,onemightinitially seesuchamoveasonefromacollective fo-
cus to an individual one, from social and political questions to ones
of the individual psyche. In Kristeva’s case this is far more obvious,
but  i ek worksveryhard to ensure that hisreading ofpsychoanaly-
sis is as much social as it is individual.
Letmebeginwith i ek.WhenMarxappearsin i ek’searly
work as the direct subject of discussion, he is a proto-Lacanian, one
responsible for first formulating, however imperfectly, the crucial
Lacanian category of the constitutive exception. In the first chapter
of the first book in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology,  i ek
frames this in terms of how Marx ‘invented the notion of the symp-
tom’(1989:11),particularlyinthewell-knowndiscussioninthefirst
part of Capital on the fetishism of commodities.Yet, although  i ek
credits Marx for his original idea, for setting on its way a category
that would bear untold fruit, in the end Marx is but a first step on the
way to Lacan, via Freud.
Like Freud who followed him, Marx’s insight was to seek the
secret of the form, not the content hidden behind the form, let alone
the content itself. For Marx the question was the commodity form:
how does it function in providing the key to capitalism as a distinct
mode of production? He was not interested in the hidden content of
the commodity (human labour), since classical economists had al-
ready unearthed that content. Rather, he sought the reason for the
form itself. What Marx did was take the anomalies of capitalism, the
perceived blockages and distortions of the system as the secret of the
system itself: in short, the constitutive exception. Thus, the cycles of
boom and bust, economic crises and wars, are not deviations that
stand in thewayofthefullrealization ofcapitalism,butsymptomsof
the system, revealing the fundamentally antagonistic and unstable
nature of capitalism. In other words, as  i ek will point out time and
again,drawingfromMarx’sthirdvolumeofCapital,thelimitofcap-
italism is Capital itself (see  i ek 1989: 51). Not only does the capi-
talist mode of production generate its own internal limit, but the limit
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7to the system is that which provides the very possibility of that sys-
tem.Hence,inlightoftheconstanttensionbetweentheforcesandre-
lations of production, the constant need to revolutionize itself to sur-
vive, the ‘normal’ state of instability and imbalance, ‘it is this very
immanent limit, this “internal contradiction,” which drives capital-
ism into permanent development’( i ek 1989: 52). For instance, the
dream of open competition sees the great hurdle not merely in terms
of tariffs imposed by the governments of various nation-states, but in
monopolies. Yet, the desire to outstrip one’s competitors has as its fi-
nal goal precisely such a market monopoly, which then becomes the
condition of possibility, the constitutive limit, of the ‘free market’.
For  i ek, it is Marx’s focus on the anomalies and disrup-
tions, on the excesses that show how the system really works, that is
the same as Freud’s method. For Freud the secret to the human psy-
che lies not in its normal operation, but in the slips, breaks and
dreams that provide the glimpses of another, deeper logic. Put suc-
cinctly, the questions Marx and Freud sought to answer were: why
does the result of human labour take the commodity form, and why
have latent-dream thoughts assumed the form they have, appearing
in dreams? In the specific form of the symptom, both Marx and
Freud makethe discovery that will become crucial for  i ek’s work,
namely, the constitutive exception. It will turn out to be at the centre
of his flood of Lacanian insights.
However, what we find in The Sublime Object of Ideology is
that Marx quickly drops behind the scenes: when he does appear he
is immediatelysubjected to re-readings in which Lacan provides the
keys. In fact, most of Marx’s positions fall short before the feet of
Lacan in what becomes a rather familiar pattern of discerning the
function of the constitutive exception. Let me give a few examples.
As far as ideology is concerned, for Marx ‘the ideological gaze is a
partialgazeoverlooking thetotality ofsocialrelations’( i ek1989:
49). Ideology is a false universalisation in which a contingent and
historically particular position becomes dominant, such as human
rights which are in fact the tool of capitalist exploitation, or the ge-
neric‘man’whichisinfactthebourgeoisindividual. Bycontrast,for
Lacan‘ideologyratherdesignatesatotalitysetoneffacingthetraces
of its own impossibility’( i ek 1989: 49), examples of which I have
already cited – Capital as the limitof capitalism, the extraneous item
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to money, in order to answer the question Marx himself was unable
to answer – to specify the sublime material character of money, the
indestructible and non-corruptible material of money that endures
beyond its immediate material nature –  i ek argues that only the
‘psychoanalytic notion of money as a “pre-phallic,” “anal” object is
acceptable’ ( i ek 1989: 18), but only if we remember that such a
notion of the sublime body depends on the Symbolic order. Finally,
concerning surplus value, what Marx failed to see in his theory of
surplus value, ‘the ‘cause which sets in motion the capitalist process
of production’ ( i ek 1989: 53), is the function of surplus-enjoy-
ment,the object-cause of desire, the excess that embodies the funda-
mental lack.
What I want to pick up, however, is the way  i ek turns
Marx’s discovery of the symptom back upon him, via Lacan. Even
with the few examples I have given, the characteristic  i ekian
move becomes clear: the identification of that which is excluded or,
even more profoundly, the methodological assumption that what
cannot be identified – variously the Real, the surplus object, objet
petit a, the fetish, woman and so on – provides us with the structural
logic of the system, of thought, society, economics or whatever. As
far as socialism itself is concerned, the fundamental problem is that
socialism is not possible if we stick with Marx’s logic – or is that
Lacan’slogic? Thus,inlightoftheargumentthattheverypossibility
of a particular system may be found in its limits, socialism must
therefore operate with similar blockages, anomalies that both fore-
stallthefullrealization ofsocialismandtherebyenable itsveryexis-
tence. Or, in terms of the tension between the relations and forces of
production, Marx was right when he saw this tension as the very
logic of the capitalism itself, the instability and constant revoluti-
onalizing that are the result of this tension or limit. But Marx was
wrong when he argued that a socialist revolution arises when the
forces of production outstrip their relations, and that socialism
would rearrange the relations of production in order to release the
forcesofproduction. Inotherwords,socialismcouldnotavoidrepli-
catingthelogicofcapitalism:‘Isitnotalreadyacommonplacetoas-
sert that “real socialism” has rendered possible rapid industrializa-
tion, but that as soon as the productive forces have reached a certain
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7level of development (usually designated by the vague term
“post-industrial society”), “real socialist” social relations began to
constrict their further growth?’ ( i ek 1989: 53) The ingenuity of
 i ek is that he locates the impossibility of socialism squarely with
Marx and the contradictions of his various texts – in this case the
thirdvolumeofCapital andtheCritiqueofPolitical Economy.Butit
is a reading saturated with Lacan; hence  i ek’s preference for the
first option, in which the limit of capitalism is Capital itself.
Insum,wefindasituationwhereMarxprovidestheprecursor
toLacan’sconstitutive exception, whichwillthencometoouraidby
cleaning up Marx’s errors one after the other. As we move over to
Kristeva, we might find that the subject matter is different, but the
way Kristeva deals with Marx is remarkably similarto that of  i ek.
Kristeva sidelines, conceals and bypasses Marx, but above all she
trumps Marx through psychoanalysis.
In order to show how she does so, I focus on a key essay writ-
ten in 1968, ‘Semiotics: ACritical Science and/or a Critique of Sci-
ence’ (Kristeva 1986: 74-88), an essay that is an extended engage-
ment with Marx. Two parts of her argument interest mehere. Firstly,
Kristeva identifies what she sees as Marx’s great insight, namely the
immanentmethod.Secondly,shearguesthatforallhisinsight, Marx
fallsshortwhenhecomestodiscussthekeycategoriesofproduction
and work. At this point, according to Kristeva, Freud provides a far
better analysis.
What is Marx’s insight? For Kristeva, he gave us a crucial
‘epistemological break’(Kristeva 1986: 79) that is, quite simply, the
immanent method, a method that emerges from the item or work in
question rather than from outside. It also means that criticism must
arise from the object under criticism. Thus, if we want to interpret
the work of someone, say, like Kristeva, it means that we will use
their own methods to interpret them. For Kristeva, Marx is ‘the first
to practise’this method (Kristeva 1986: 78).
1
Kristeva’s interest, at least at this moment, is on the implica-
tions of Marx’s insight for semiotics. Thus, ‘No form of semiotics,
therefore, can exist other than as a critique of semiotics’ (Kristeva
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1 In her early Revolution in Poetic Language, she also gives Marx his due for
pointingout that the signifyingprocess liesoutsidethe sphere of materialproduction
(1984: 105).1986: 78). Or, in the dense detail of her early writing, semiotics is the
veryactofproducingmodels.LetmequoteKristevaagain:itis‘afor-
malizationorproductionofmodels.Thus,whenwesaysemiotics,we
meanthe(asyetunrealized)developmentofmodels,thatis,offormal
systemswhosestructureisisomorphicoranalogoustothestructureof
another system (the system under study)’(Kristeva 1986: 76).
Marx, it seems,couldn’tbe moreimportant,markingafunda-
mental break in the history of knowledge. In effect, Marx subverts
‘the termsofapreceding science’(Kristeva 1986: 80) in the termsof
that science itself. So he overturns economics by means of econom-
ics.Forinstance,hetakestheterm‘surplusvalue’fromthemercanti-
lists (Smith, Ricardo et. al.) and shows how the term means not the
‘addition to the value of a product’but the extraction of profit in the
relations of work. The key is that he does so from within the theories
ofthemercantilists.Liketheirownnoses,theysimplycannotseethe
proper origins of surplus value.
However,forKristevathisisasfarasMarxcango.Inorderto
show how Marx falls short, Kristeva focuses on the question of pro-
duction and work. By means of his immanent method, Marx may
have revealed the dynamics of production, but his insight is only a
half-truth. By contrast, Freud goes all the way, bringing forth the
realmof pre-production, and that is located in nothing other than the
unconscious. To bring home her point, Kristeva focuses on Freud’s
category of the ‘dream-work’. Here Freud reveals a different type of
work that precedes and pre-conditions Marx’s notion of work. In the
dream-work, where the unconscious and scattered patterns of the
dream take on a definite narrative sequence, where the unconscious
and conscious intersect, semiotics takes root in the play of signs in
the dream. And for Kristeva, at this point in her thought, a semiotics
indebted to Freud is the way forward from Marx.
In this early essay, Kristeva trumps Marx by identifying a
moreoriginal cause–thedream-work–that liesbeneath Marx’scat-
egories of work and production. Now, I must admit to having my
misgivings concerning Kristeva’s argument: there are simply too
manysleights of hand that make mesuspicious. However, that is an-
other argument, for myinterest is in her move fromMarx to psycho-
analysis. Onthat matter,she isnot content to unearth amoreoriginal
cause, for in her later work she asserts time and again that psycho-
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7analysis outruns Marx in the final stages, providing a more compre-
hensive answer than he ever could. Thus, Freud achieves Marx’s
program of trying to unite the increasingly fragmented fields of hu-
man activity, or at least the separation of theory and action (Kristeva
1996: 151,198).Further,Freudiansocialanalysesandsolutions out-
perform an exhausted socialism (Kristeva 1995: 209-10).
For Kristeva, then, psychoanalysis is not merely more com-
prehensive than Marxism, but it also provides the personal, social
and political healing that socialism fails to provide (Kristeva 1996:
24-5). Over more than three decades, she has developed her own
brand of psychoanalysis, practicing it in her consulting roomsand in
her writings, moving from individual to global society with ease.
Thus, in her written work she tackles major themes, such as melan-
cholia (Kristeva 1989a) or the stranger (Kristeva 1991) or love
(Kristeva 1987) or the abject (Kristeva 1982) and traces them thro-
ugh signal points all the way fromancient Greece, via the Bible, and
intotheWest.Giventhevastsweepoftheseworks,herwritingtends
tobethin,ifnotbanalattimes,andherpoliticalcommentsnaïve(see
Kristeva 2002: 255-68). Her sweeping social analyses, based on an-
ecdotes and personal encounters, whether they be of France or Eu-
rope or America or Bulgaria, are efforts to pinpoint a global social
malaiseandofferacure.ItwillbeashortstepfromheretoChristian-
ity, especially when she suggests that psychoanalysis is, by offering
achance torestartpsychicallife,theonlyviable formofhumanfree-
dom, indeed that it is the vivid, fleshly realization of Christianity
(Kristeva 2002: 242)
2.
Let me sum up my argument thus far. For  i ek, (Lacanian)
psychoanalysis provides a more comprehensive articulation of key
categories that Marx first elaborated, especially the constitutive ex-
ception. For Kristeva, Marx may be responsible for the profound in-
sight of the immanentmethod, but (Freudian) psychoanalysis shows
bothamorefundamentalcauseofMarx’sinsightsanditprovidesthe
personal, and occasionally social, solutions socialism was unable to
find. There are, of course, differences between them.  i ek tries as
hard as he can to render psychoanalysis an approach with social and
political ramifications, while Kristeva focuses squarely on the indi-
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2 See also her translation of the biblical and theological elaborations on the
death of Christ in psychoanalytic terms (Kristeva 1989a: 130-5).vidual psyche, and from there she seeks to make social comments.
Further, for  i ek psychoanalysis is the best description of our cur-
rent psychic and social malaise, whereas for Kristeva, Marx does
that job well enough. The task of psychoanalysis is to offer a cure.
From Psychoanalysis to Religion
This step, from Marxism to psychoanalysis, is but the first in
the parallel paths of  i ek and Kristeva. It all becomes far more in-
triguing when they move from psychoanalysis to religion; or rather,
to religion by means of psychoanalysis. Whereas their moves from
Marxism to psychoanalysis are reasonably straightforward – Freud
or Lacan simply overtake Marx – the shift to religion is more com-
plex. In Kristeva’s case, religion is a highly useful companion for
psychoanalysis, for it offers a possible cure for all manner of pathol-
ogies. Intheend, however,religion isuseful insofarasitsstoriesand
institutions enhance the personal, and occasionally social, benefits
of psychoanalysis. For  i ek, however, religion provides the solu-
tion totheproblemsthat psychoanalysis identifies alltoo well.Inor-
der to overcome the social and psychic malaise of our contemporary
life, which for himboils down to capitalism and its depredations, we
need the revolutionary core of Christianity.
As with the previous section, let me begin with  i ek. His de-
cisive move to reclaim Christianity comes neither from some vague
religious commitment, nor even as a central item in an ethnic or na-
tional identity; rather, it arises from his desire to become a political
thinker and writer. The problem is that  i ek did in fact think that he
was a political writer, claiming that The Ticklish Subject (1999) was
his political manifesto. So Judith Butler’s criticismthat he was not in
fact a political thinker stung. Published in the dialogues between
 i ek, Butler and Ernesto Laclau, (2000), Butler points out that
 i ek’sfundamentalcategoryoftheconstitutiveexceptioncutsaway
thegroundbeneathanypoliticalmovement.Indeed,asfarasButleris
concerned, Lacanian psychoanalysis forestalls any possibility of
breaking out ofthe system, for  i ek’s dialectic generates a blockage
at the very point where such a break opens up. This works in two
ways:firstly,thepowersofdominationrelyonvariousoppositionsto
maintain and reinforce their power; secondly, any opposition move-
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7ment inevitably runs aground by betraying its ideals. It becomes
merely another version of oppression. So Butler asks  i ek:
But what remains less clear to me is how one moves beyond
such a dialectical reversal or impasse to something new. How
would the new be produced from an analysis of the social
field that remains restricted to inversions, aporias and rever-
sals that work regardless of time and place? Do these rever-
sals produce something other than their own structurally
identical repetitions (Butler, Laclau, and  i ek 2000: 29)?
We are trapped, it seems, ever to repeat ourselves in terms of
the constitutive exception. At this point,  i ek’s Eastern European
roots show forth, for that is precisely where the socialist revolutions
ran aground, and where the revolutions of the late 1980s and early
1990s alsofailed tolive uptotheirpromiseofapath that wasneither
capitalist nor socialist. His theories cannot be divorced from his
livedexperience inYugoslavia andthenSlovenia–hencehistouchi-
ness about any new political movement.
What does  i ek do in response? He makes a most extraordi-
nary turn to Christianity in three books that may be called his Chris-
tian trilogy: The Fragile Absolute (2000), On Belief (2001) and The
Puppet and the Dwarf (2003). In contrast to his earlier dabbling in
religion, these really are a full-scale engagement. Put simply, his po-
sition is that if Lacanian psychoanalysis provides the most compre-
hensive criticism of how life is under capitalism, then Christianity,
especially the few letters of Paul in the New Testament, give us the
means for overcoming it and moving past capitalism.
Now,  i ek is not known for his ability to develop a consis-
tent and linear argument. It is one of the delights of his work, but it
also leads himinto someastounding blind alleys. Thus, in TheFrag-
ile Absolute he begins by outlining the rampages of global capital-
ism, the pseudo-fixes of New Age spirituality and postmodern poli-
tics, only to offer a solution that relies on ‘Christian love’and ethics.
‘Christian love’is none other agape, offering not the mix of lust and
soppy feelings that attach to the current uses of the term‘love’, but a
tough political love that does not avoid difficult choices. However,
once he has broached the topic of love,  i ek cannot avoid insisting
on ethics as a crucial dimension of politics.
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love as the revolutionary core of Christianity ( i ek 2004a). How-
ever,inthe second volumeofhistrilogy,OnBelief (2001), hebegins
again and this time discovers Paul’s doctrine of grace, which he ar-
gues is a much morepowerful political category. This discovery – in
effect, i ek’sownProtestantReformation–isabelatedrecognition
of the influence of Alain Badiou’sstudy of the Apostle Paul (Badiou
2003). In On Belief  i ek recognises the materialist notion of grace
that Badiou champions: grace signifies what comes from entirely
outside the system; it is undeserved, unearned, unexpected and in-
calculable. Yet, even here  i ek only partially realizes Badiou’s
point,for i ekstillseeshumanagencyatthecentreofsuchanotion
of grace. Unexpected and unearned it may be, but grace for  i ek is
still brought about by human political agents.
Only in the final book, The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003),
does i ekstumbleuponthepossibilitythatsuchpolitical andsocial
change may happen outside human agency. He does not mean that
Godwillbringaboutsuchchange(thatisPaul’sreferencepoint),but
that human beings may find that a moment of profound change may
in fact take place without their doing. Like Badiou,  izek leaves
open the question as to who or what that agent maybe. However, for
all his belated insight, it is a passing moment, for the book reiterates
many of the positions from the previous books: we find love return-
ing, often in a confused fashion as the equivalent of grace; the mal-
aise of capitalism is still one to be overcome and New Age religion
must be avoided at all costs.
 i eknowhasthepoliticalandsocialsolutiontotheproblems
thatLacanianpsychoanalysisoutlinessowell.Onequestionremains:
where does it lead him? To begin with, it forces him to drop Lacan,
even if momentarily, as he expounds what he feels is the core of Paul
and Christianity. Yet he does not leave Lacan on the side of the road
for too long, for we find him returning in later works. Secondly, it
leads  i ek to Lenin. As Paul is to Christianity, so Lenin is to Marx-
ism; indeed, Paul in the New Testament enables  izek to become a
Leninist, a ‘fighting materialist’as he calls himself ( i ek 2000: 1).
Lenin’sideaof‘actualfreedom’–steppingoutsidethecontexttopro-
duce a proper free choice – is nothing other than a version of Paul’s
grace.Thelater i ekhasbecomeaMarxistintheWest,especiallyof
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7the Leninist variety. It is precisely through his readings of the New
Testament that  i ek has, perhaps for the first time, championed
Marx, abandoning his earlier ambivalence over Marxism.
In sum,in response to Judith Butler’s charge that psychoanal-
ysis blocks any viable politics, Christianity provides  i ek with a
political answer that Lacanian psychoanalysis was unable to pro-
vide. Although his position on the core of Christianity shifts ground
–minglinglove,ethicsandgrace–hedoeshaveamomentofinsight
when he identifies grace as a crucial political category, as an unde-
served, unexpected possibility beyond human agency. The problem
isthathedoesnotholdtothisinsightintograce:hecontinuestomin-
gleandconfuse‘Christianlove’,grace,Christianityandpsychoanal-
ysis in curious ways.
Kristeva too finds Christianity extraordinarily useful, al-
though for slightly different reasons. For some years now Kristeva
hasbeen writing ontheBible, aswellascrucial figuresinthehistory
ofChristianthoughtandartsuchasAugustine,AquinasandHolbein
(Kristeva 1991: 83-93; 1989a: 105-38; 1987: 170-87). However, if
we focus on her interpretations of the Bible, then we find that it is at
best patchy: someofitisquite good and someratherterrible. Forex-
ample, her readings of Ruth (Kristeva 1991: 69-76), the Song of
Songs (Kristeva 1987: 83-100), or Hebrew language (Kristeva
1989b: 98-103) are ordinary and superficial. She argues for conven-
tional, even conservative positions as though they are blindingly
new discoveries. Thus, the Song of Songs is about heterosexual,
even matrimonial, love, or Ruth is a model of tolerance and wel-
come. The reading of the Levitical food taboos in Powers of Horror
(Kristeva 1982: 90-112) is much better and contains a distinct in-
sight or two that have been noticed in biblical studies (Black 2006).
The quality of her engagements with Paul in the New Testament is
alsosomewhatbetter,soIfocusontheseworksheresincetheyshow
how closely she weaves Christian texts and psychoanalysis.
While for  i ek, the Bible provides the political and social
remedies for our current problems, for Kristeva the Bible expresses
in another, highly effective language the therapeutic possibilities of
psychoanalysis. Paul is for her one of the best instances of this
religio-psychoanalytical intersection. There are two texts on Paul,
one focusing onthe formationofthe individual subject fromTalesof
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agenda fromStrangers to Ourselves (Kristeva 1991: 76-83). Not un-
expectedly, she finds more in the individual implications of Paul’s
thought than the social.
Kristeva’sargumentinbothisreallyquitesimple:through his
narrative of the life and death of Jesus Christ – the predictions in the
Hebrew prophets, his death and resurrection, his designation as son
of God, and the gifts of grace and faith – Paul provides answers and
cures for nearly all the psychological pathologies. As for Paul, he
never fails to seize an opportunity to retell the story (see, for in-
stance,Romans1:2-6;3:21-6;4:24-5;5:6-11;6:3-11;8:11,32;10:9;
14:8-9). For Kristeva, Paul’s genius is that this narrative of Christ’s
temporarydeath is able to deal with narcissism, masochism,fantasy,
repression, death drive, oral sadism and psychosis.
Let me take masochism as an example and examine Kris-
teva’s argument more closely. There are two steps in her argument.
To begin with, she dives into Paul’s convoluted arguments to come
up with nothing other than a variation of the scapegoat. Here is
Kristeva: ‘Sacrifice is an offering that, out of a substance, creates
Meaning for the Other and, consequently, for the social group that is
dependent on it’(Kristeva 1987: 142-3). In other words, you obliter-
ate something concrete – a red heifer, a goat, a human being – in or-
der to produce the abstract sense of the group. The most common
way in which that happens is to transfer the group’s ‘sins’symboli-
cally onto the scapegoat and then cast all this evil out of the commu-
nity – by banishing the scapegoat – for the wellbeing of the commu-
nity. The catch here is that you create the symbolic notion of the
group in the very process of identifying what is good and bad about
it. The second step picks up Rom 6:5: ‘If in union with Christ we
have imitated (omoiomati) his death, we shall also imitate him in his
resurrection’. From imitation we move via identification with the
victim to the internalization of murder and thence to masochism.
Kristeva does not shy away from stating that Paul’s logic is masoch-
istic – ‘Jubilatory suffering inflicted on one’s own body by a su-
premeandcherished authorityprobablyisthetraittheyhaveincom-
mon’ (Kristeva 1987: 143). But Paul goes beyond such masochism
by making it analogous rather than real. Just as the initial sacrifice
was symbolicrather than real, so the second, masochistic sacrifice is
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7analogous and not real. But note how Paul does it: Christ intervenes
in order to overcome the pathology. Here he is the means by which
masochism becomes analogous: believers die in a manner analo-
gous to Christ, not as Christ.
What about the other pathologies? Paul’s thought identifies
and then negates or goes beyond the pathology in question, and, just
asinthecaseofmasochism,eachtimehedoessobymeansofChrist.
Thus fantasy is neutralised by making the passion of the cross a uni-
versal narrative. This short-circuits fantasy since we can no longer
identify our individual selves as Christ. Further, repression is
avoided by means of idealizing one’s own death; that is, one’s death
is brought to the fore, rather than repressed, in the narrative of
Christ’s death and resurrection.
3 So also do we avoid the destructive
pathofthedeathdrive(unlikeSadeorArtaud),sincethisnarrativeis
a collective one that prevents us from identifying with the Father on
our own, of writing ourselves into the story. If repression and the
death drive are negated, narcissism is appropriated and then over-
come.Oneappropriates narcissismbyaccepting that death (thelimit
of negative narcissism) is the way to achieve salvation. However,
Paul overcomes narcissism by shifting the death onto Christ, and so
it ceases to be narcissism, since it is focussed on another (Kristeva
quotes Gal 2:20 at this point). We still have salvation, but not narcis-
sism. Finally, oral sadism is conquered by the mediation of Christ:
placedinbetweentheselfanditsdestructive hunger,Christredirects
oralsadism.Sinceoralsadismisprimarilydirectedatthemother,the
Son overcomes this by stepping in between and being eaten himself.
Kristeva is of course referring to the Eucharist or the love-feast.
There is no sadistic satisfaction in such an eating of the Son of the
Father (not the mother), and so it becomes the means for identifica-
tion with the Father.
The pattern is remarkably similar: fantasy, repression, the
death drive, narcissism, oral sadism and even masochism are either
negated or traversed by means of the narrative of Christ. These are
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3 Or, as Kristeva puts it New Maladies of the Soul, the taboos of Leviticus of-
ferawaytobypassthenecessaryrepressionofthedesireformurder.Sincesuchade-
sire is primarily a desire to murder the mother, by enabling a separation from the
mother, specifically in terms of transforming sacrifice into a language and system of
meaning, the Bible defuses such a desire (Kristeva 1995: 120). I must confess that
this focus on the maternal function seems somewhat dated now.all primarily individual pathologies, and Paul provides a means for
overcoming them. Yet one pathology remains: psychosis, which is
for Kristeva the sole collective pathology. In a passage from Strang-
ers to Ourselves (Kristeva 1991: 76-83), we find the idea that Paul’s
ekklesia speaks to psychic distress and soothes psychosis, which is
usually divided into schizophrenia and paranoia. This ekklesia is a
‘community of foreigners’ (Kristeva 1991: 80). It is an ‘ideal com-
munity’, ‘an original entity’, a ‘messianism that includes all of hu-
mankind’ (Kristeva 1991: 80); in short, nothing less than a trans-
formed society.
What marks this new community is that it offers answers to
people’s psychic distress.
4 More specifically, the ekklesia soothes
psychosis: it answers the schizophrenic split of the foreigner, for the
ekklesia is by its very nature a foreign collective. But Kristeva goes
further, for the ekklesia embodies within itself this psychosis. The
waythisworksisthatinsteadoftryingtoinsertforeignersintoanex-
isting social body, Paul recognises the foreigner’s split between two
countries and transformsit into the passage between and negotiation
of two psychic domains – between flesh and spirit, life and death,
crucifixion and resurrection in a body that is simultaneously the
group and Christ’s body (see Rom 12: 4-5). Their external division
becomesaninternal one,internal tothecollective’sconstruction and
the individual’s psyche. The way Paul soothes such psychosis is that
such a split is ‘experienced as a transition toward a spiritual libera-
tion starting from and within a concrete body’(Kristeva 1991: 82).
In short, for Kristeva Paul’s ekklesia becomes a therapeutic device,
and Paul is nothing other than ‘a psychologist, and if the institution
he sets up is also political, its efficiency rests on the psychological
intuition of its founder’(Kristeva 1991: 82).
It should by now be obvious that while their individual argu-
ments may vary, the paths both Kristeva and  i ek follow are re-
markably similar. And they end up at strikingly similar conclusions
concerning Christianity, especially the NewTestamenttexts of Paul:
Christianity provides the social and personal answers that they both
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4 ForKristeva,thisisalsoafeatureofsacredtextsmoregenerally:‘Ifitistrue
that all texts considered “sacred” refer to borderline states of subjectivity, we have
reason to reflect upon these states, especially since the biblical narrator is familiar
with them’(Kristeva 1995: 117).seekintheirdifferentways.Occasionally i ekmighthopethatpsy-
choanalysis doesthejob,butmoreoftenitundercuts anysucheffort.
Kristeva, by contrast is much more optimistic about psychoanalysis,
which carries out the same therapeutic tasks as Christianity, al-
though in a different language.
All You Need is Love
There is, however, one point on which they agree: the idea
and practice of Christian love is crucial for any redemptive social
role for Christianity. Or, as Kristeva once put it: ‘Love will save us’
(Kristeva 1996: 121). For his part,  i ek makes the extraordinary
claim that ‘love’ in Lacan’s Seminar XX is in fact Christian love
(2000: 118; see 2003: 116). What he means here is that the funda-
mentalunbalancing ofChristianlove,itsthreattocosmicorderisthe
point at which it starts to look the same as Lacan’s notion of love.
Now, I have argued elsewhere that I am not at all persuaded by such
argumentsconcerning love (Boer2007), orindeed bythelinks made
with ethics. However, my interest here is with the curiously similar
tracks that  i ek and Kristeva follow.
Unfortunately,  i ek is far too enamoured with Christian
love. Despite thefleeting insight into thenature ofgracethat Itraced
in my earlier discussion of  i ek’s Christian trilogy, in his later re-
flections ( i ek 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005) he returns to all the
confusions of those earlier works – love is the same as grace, love is
crucial for politics and thereby for ethics. His constantly reiterated
point is that Christian love – he means agape, rather than the radical
communal love of philadelphia that we also find in the New Testa-
ment – is the key to revolutionary politics.
Two biblical texts are crucial for  i ek, namely Luke 14:26
and 1Corinthians 13. Both appear on anumberofoccasions inorder
to make related points. Luke 14:26 reads: ‘If any one comes to me
and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children
and brothers sisters, yes, even his own life, he cannot be my disci-
ple’.Ononeoccasion  i ekreadsthiscalltodiscipleship intermsof
the constitutive exception: one must renounce everything for the
sake of Christ in order to get it back ( i ek 1999: 115). On another
he sees this as a call to tough love, as a love ‘that enjoins us to “un-
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2000:121).Itisthistypeoflovethathefindsin1Corinthians13,the
famous text that states, ‘Love is patient and kind…’(1 Corinthians
13:4). Or indeed Galatians 3:28: ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek,
there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for
you are all one in Christ’.
Kristeva for her part is also deep in love. Indeed, one of her
texts on Paul is called ‘God is Love’ (Kristeva 1987: 139-50). Here
she argues that the ‘true revolution’ of Christianity was its focus on
agape as the centre of its message. Elevated over against the sensual
love of eros, agape (Christian love) becomes in Paul theocentric:
rather than human love of God, the key becomes God’s love for hu-
man beings. If God is the locus of agape while human beings become
the place of pistis: ‘God is the first to love; as center, source, and gift,
his love comes to us without our having to deserve it – it falls, strictly
speaking, from heaven and imposes itself with the requirement of
faith’(Kristeva 1987: 140). At this point it seems as though Kristeva
and  i ek are reading the same script, even down to neglecting the
crucial role of philia and philadelphia in the New Testament. To be
frank, I am less than impressed by their concern with love. Indeed,
giventhesteadystreamofself-helpandphilosophicalbooksonlove,I
propose at least half a century’s ban on any discussion of love.
Going West: The Search for Redemption
What are we to make of these strikingly similar paths from
Marx, through psychoanalysis to Christianity, especially the New
Testament theme of love, or agape? There are three points to be
made in answering this question. The first is that for both  i ek and
Kristeva it is part of a process of dealing with their departures from
Eastern Europe. By ‘departure’I mean not merely the physical tak-
ing leave, but also the intellectual and political departures they have
made. Further, we cannot separate their individual moves from the
political and social history of Eastern Europe. Let me say a little
about each level.
With the assistance of scholarship from Charles de Gaulle,
Kristeva moved physically to Paris from Bulgaria when she was a
young doctoral student in 1965. As she immersed himself in the intel-
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7lectual and social life of Paris, becoming part of the Tel Quel group,
she neglected and distanced herself from her native Bulgaria, only to
reassert that identity much later when she was a member of Mitter-
and’s entourage that visited Bulgaria in 1989.  i ek, by comparison,
has always maintained his connections with Slovenia, although much
less so with the ‘former’ Yugoslavia. But  i ek moved much later,
after 1989 and the changes that took place in Eastern Europe. He was
soon to become what the French call a ‘turbo-prof’, taking up
well-paid short teaching positions in the USAand Western Europe.
1989is,ofcourse,acrucialyear. i ekfirstmadehismarkaf-
ter 1989 when he began publishing in English and travelling, while
Kristeva only began to comment on Eastern Europe after this date.
But it is also when the communistgovernments finally fell, one after
the other, in a series of largely peaceful revolutions. It hardly needs
to be said that the promise of a new way forward in those years has
largely evaporated before the adoption of a rampant capitalism. Yet,
in my visits to and discussions in Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary, I
have found a real ambivalence to the socialist past. In the many dis-
cussions what came through time and again was the memory of the
excitement of 1989, the profound sense – for a brief period – that
anything was possible. Some felt ‘good riddance’ to communism,
that communism was merely another means for the exercise of
power by some human beings over others. Others felt that for all its
flaws it was better than capitalism, and others saw the ambiguities,
the gains and losses of the present. The question I kept asking – ‘but
when the changes took place in ’89, did you imagine it would turn
out like this?’ – was answered in as many ways as the reader can
imagine,although perhapsthesensewasthatthepresentdidn’tquite
live up to the hopes of that time. I noticed the donkeys and carts in
the country and was told that with the privatisation of land after the
end of communism, many farmers could not afford machinery and
had therefore gone back to hand harvesting and animal power. In the
cities they were allowed again and the gypsies used them. One per-
son excused the enthusiastic embracing the worst of US capitalism
bysayingthatEasternEuropeansarenotyetverygoodatbeingcapi-
talist,butanotherpointedoutthattheyareexceedingly good.Yetan-
other suggested that Eastern Europe mightstill be able to forge adif-
ferenttypeofcapitalism.Oftenitseemedtomethattherewasarapid
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was in some way not comfortable with it. In fact, it struck me that
many of those I spoke with are so deeply socialist in their assump-
tions and beliefs that they are not even aware of it. The assumptions
of how a society should work with a widespread ‘safety network’as
itiscalled –medicine,adequate holidays, maternityleave, condition
ofemployment,schoolsanduniversities without feesandsoon–are
anathema to the market economists having their way in the USA,
Australia and other places.
This is the type of ambivalence I find in the work of  i ek and
Kristeva. Let me give two examples, one from each.  i ek is a great
loverofthejoke,aswasFreud.But i ek’sjokesaremostlyaboutthe
former communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe. For example, at
the beginning of For They Know Not What They Do we find Rab-
inovitch, the Soviet Jew who seeks to emigrate. The emigration offi-
cer inquires concerning his reasons, to which Rabinovitch replies:
‘Therearetworeasonswhy.ThefirstisthatI’mafraidthatthe
CommunistswilllosepowerintheSovietUnion,andthenew
forceswillblameusJewsfortheCommunistcrimes…’‘But’,
interrupts the bureaucrat, ‘this is pure nonsense, the power of
the Communists will last for ever!’ ‘Well’, responds Rabin-
ovitch calmly, ‘that’s my second reason’( i ek 1991: 1).
However,  i ek’s interest in the joke is not in its original
form, before the ‘collapse’of communism in Eastern Europe, but in
theturmoilofthefalsefreedomofcapitalismthatensuedintheyears
whirling around 1989. Thus, with Jews steadily leaving the Soviet
Union and thereturnofovert anti-Semitism, i ek imaginesarever-
sal of the joke:
‘Therearetworeasonswhy.Thefirstisthat Iknowthat Com-
munisminRussiawilllastforever,nothingwillreallychange
here, and this prospect is unbearable for me…’ ‘But’, inter-
rupts the bureaucrat, ‘this is pure nonsense, Communism is
disintegrating all around! All those responsible for the Com-
munist crimes will be severely punished!’‘That’s my second
reason!’responds Rabinovitch ( i ek 1991: 1)
What we find in this joke and many others like it is that Marx
is conveniently sidelined, standing back in at least the second row:
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experiment in socialism except perhaps for China, but he rewrites
the joke in terms of the end of communism itself. Elsewhere he
writes of Yugoslavia and Slovenia, often by reciting experiences in
the armyor filthy jokes, or he will speak of communistEurope more
generally. Jokes like these bring out most sharply  i ek’s ambiva-
lence about the socialism of Eastern Europe, let alone the role of
Marx: one must of course refer to him, especially in the context of
the massive changes that took place in the 80s and 90s, but he is in
the past, the motivation for a failed economic and political system.
Kristeva too is ambivalent, although she has been much more
negative about communism, and even claims to have all but lost her
native Bulgarian tongue (Kristeva 2002: 242-3). Occasionally she
bringsforththeconventional argumentthatweneedtoavoidthetwo
totalitarian extremes of Fascism and Stalinism – a refrain from her
earliest texts (Kristeva 1980: 23) – by means of some mythical mid-
dle way. However, it is in her comments on feminism that a greater
ambivalence about Marxism shows itself. Kristeva has, infamously,
kept feminismat an arm’s length, especially with an American audi-
ence in mind. For example, in her trilogy, Female Genius, she fo-
cuses on three womenwhowereindependent fromand placed them-
selves, like Kristeva herself, above and beyond feminism as well as
Marxism–HannahArendt(Kristeva2001),MelanieKlein(Kristeva
2004b) and Colette (Kristeva 2004a). From this perspective, Kris-
teva can then view feminism in terms of three overlapping stages:
the demand for political rights by the suffragettes; the assertion of
ontological equality; and, since May ’68, the search for sexual dif-
ference (Kristeva 2004a: 404). The problem, as far as Kristeva is
concerned, is that feminism is trapped between two dogmatisms
(Kristeva 1996: 7), either the dogmatism of ‘leftism’, as she tends to
call it,oraconservative dogmatismofpatriarchy and theright. Fem-
inism tends either to mirror this second dogmatism, the one that it
opposes, or take up communist dogmatism in its drive for liberation
for all women. All too easily, feminism finds itself slipping into ei-
ther form of totalitarianism.
Her answer to this problem is as important as it is intriguing.
In response to feminist agendas for social change based on gender,
she states:
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lapse of the Marxist and socialist idea is showing something
else. It shows that we can arrive at a better society not before
bourgeois individualism but after. I think they ought to revise
theirideas,seeingwhatishappening intheEastnow.Because
manyfeminist ideas were unconsciously calculated and mod-
elledontheimageofcommunistandMarxistcountries,asifa
progressive and communitarian ideology could produce the
economyofbourgeoissociety.Nowonerealizesthatonecan-
not just makethe systemof a society fromthe model of ideol-
ogy. It is necessary to transform it. But not on this side of it,
but by passing to the other side (Kristeva 1996: 45).
SuchastatementthrowsKristeva’sambivalence overEastern
Europe into sharp relief. On the one hand, she often invokes terms
such as freedom and democracy (without any qualifiers), or ‘plural-
ity of consciences’(Kristeva 1996: 51), or the importance of the in-
dividual, and dismisses communism as inherently totalizing. But
here she produces a statement that runs against those comments.
Firstly, against any notion of idealism, she states bluntly that an ide-
ology–herefeminism–cannot asocietymake.Secondly,feminism,
understood as a progressive and communitarian ideology, is incom-
patible with bourgeois society.
5 Thirdly, the society desired by femi-
nism and communism must come after bourgeois individualism –
i.e. liberalism – and not before. Here Kristeva calls on the Marx who
arguesthatthefullrunofcapitalismmustbeexperienced firstbefore
anything different may come into being.
As for the second point, the moves from Marxism through
psychoanalysis and to Pauline Christianity also signal another path,
namelyfroma collective to an individual focus, and then to a collec-
tive one again. As both  i ek and Kristeva move to psychoanalysis,
theymovefromwhatisprimarilyacollective programme–forallits
abuses – to an individual one. By now my observation will be obvi-
ous: such a shift reflects their own intellectual and personal moves
from a crumbling socialism in Eastern Europe to a capitalist West.
 i ek works overtime to ensure that his type of psychoanalysis is as
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5 She makes a very similar point concerning the incompatibility between
Mitterand’ssocialistagendaandFrance’scapitalisteconomyinthecontextoftheEu-
ropean common market (Kristeva 1996: 154).social and political as it can be, and yet he comes face to face with
the challenge by Judith Butler that it is in the end not political, or
rather, that it undercuts any programme for political change; hence
the move to Christianity, which provides him with another language
for collective redemption. Kristeva, on the other hand, is muchmore
enamoured with the focus of psychoanalysis on the individual psy-
che, even to the point of seeing most of Paul’s contributions in this
vein. Only in the last instance, with psychosis, does she see a dis-
tinctly collective solution from Paul.
Finally,thereisaresidual socialismdeepintheirwork,which
is a legacy of their backgrounds in a socialist Eastern Europe. Both
 i ek and Kristeva are still faithful to the agenda they feel they have
left behind: they still seek a way to salve the ravages of capitalism;
they still seek a solution, a revolutionary way out of the current situ-
ation. If Marx won’t do it, then psychoanalysis might. And if psy-
choanalysis can’t do it, then Christianity, especially Christian love,
provides a possible answer.
It is this part of their background that shows up so sharply in
their work – the desire for a means of redemption. At that level, they
are still faithful to Marx’s impulse. Kristeva may feel that we ‘may
need to be slightly Marxist…’(Kristeva 1996: 70), while  i ek has,
as I pointed out earlier, recovered a militant Leninist Marxism
throughPaulineChristianity.Theunderlyingdrive,however,hasnot
changed. In both cases, their moves to Christianity function as sub-
stitutes for a sidelined Marxism (in Kristeva’s case) or as a comple-
ment to a recovered Marxism (in  i ek’s case). And for both it is a
redemptive programme: Christianity enables  i ek to develop a po-
litically redemptive agenda, while for Kristeva Christianity enables
her to produce a therapeutic psychology of religion.
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Roland Boer
POTRAGA ZA ISKUPLJENJEM: JULIA KRISTEVA I SLAVOJ
 I EK O MARXU, PSIHOANALIZI I RELIGIJI
Sa etak
Slavoj  i ek i Julia Kristeva su sledili neobièno sliène puteve u svom intelek-
tualnom i politièkom razvoju od marksizma, preko psihoanalize, do hrišæanstva. Ovaj
èlanak prati naèin na koji su se oni distancirali od marksizma i preuzeli psihoanalizu u
frojdovskoj ili lakanovskoj verziji. Za Kristevu psihoanaliza pru a terapeutsko rešenje
za individualne i, povremeno, društvene probleme, dok za  i eka ona predstavlja
najbolji opis tih problema, ali ne nu no i odgovor na njih. Pa ipak, posredstvom psiho-
analize, oni su otišli korak dalje, postavši zaukupljeni hrišæanstvom, osobito Pavlovim
pismima u Novom zavetu i uèenjem o ljubavi. Za Kristevu Pavle pru a drukèiju i rani-
ju verziju psihoanalitièkih rešenja, a  i eku on poma e da naðe socijalne i politièke
odgovore koje tra i. Dovodeæi u vezu ove intelektualne pomake s njihovim vlastitim
napuštanjem Istoène Evrope, Jugoslavije (a potom i Slovenije) u jednom sluèaju, i Bu-
garske u drugom, zastupam stanovište da njihova potraga za iskupljenjem, u liènom i
socijalnomsmislu,odajerecidivesocijalizma.Ustvari,njihovokretanjekapsihoanali-
ziihrišæanstvumoglobisetumaèitikaokompenzacijazaizgubljenisocijalizam,utoli-
ko što  i ek pomalo zadocnelo obnavlja Marksa posredstvom hrišæanstva, a Kristeva
nikad ne mo e da izbaci Marksa iz svog mišljenja.
Kljuène reèi: Slavoj  i ek, Julia Kristeva, marksizam, psihoanaliza,
hrišæanstvo.
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